Palestine’s Best Interests: Accepting Israel as Its Neighbor

Imagine this proposal: Pakistan, with its 150 million people, 350,000 square miles, and 80 years of history should simply cease to exist. Deport every Pakistani. Hand the territory to India. Sound absurd? It is. Pakistan has a formidable military, diplomatic ties with the USA, Russia, and China, and despite being ranked the 7th most hated country in 2024 by worldpopulationreview.com, it’s not going anywhere.

Now consider Israel—ranked 6th most hated, just ahead of Pakistan. A nation of 10 million on 9,000 square miles with a $50,000 GDP per capita and the Middle East’s most powerful military. Yet some advocate for its dissolution, suggesting all Israelis be expelled and the land given to Palestinians. Ask yourself: is this any more realistic than erasing Pakistan? The answer defines the conversation we should actually be having about Palestine’s future.

Since its founding, Israel has won every war it faced—the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War—always sustaining fewer casualties while inflicting more damage. The Israel Defense Forces command dominance on land, sea, and air. And whether we approve or not, Israel possesses nuclear weapons with second-strike submarine capabilities, making it untouchable militarily. But here’s the critical question: Have any of these wars produced long-term benefits for Palestinians? The answer is a resounding no. Each conflict has brought more suffering, more displacement, more lost opportunities.

WarIsraeli CasualtiesOpponent CasualtiesConsequences for the Palestinians
1948 Arab – Israeli War70006300750,000 Palestinians expelled
1967 Six Day War100015000400,000 Palestinians displaced from West Bank, Gaza
First Intifada280015000Creation of the West Bank area
Second Intifada10003500Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip
2023 Israel – Hamas War200050,000Aerial bombardment & invasion of Gaza

Military might alone doesn’t guarantee prosperity—just ask the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan called it “an empire of evil” in 1984, and within years, its members were fleeing westward for prosperity and freedom. The lesson? Diplomacy trumps tanks when building a sustainable future. Israel has learned this masterfully. Beyond its military prowess, it has systematically built a network of regional alliances: peace treaties with Egypt in 1980 and Jordan in 1994, then the Abraham Accords on September 15, 2020, when UAE and Bahrain recognized Israel, followed by Sudan. Yes, these are “cold peace” agreements. But remember Pakistan and India: a cold peace beats a hot war every single time.

Israeli Diplomacy in Action: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan

Then came August 28, 2023. An Israeli flight made an emergency landing in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The passengers spent the night there. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked Saudi Arabia—in Hebrew—for the hospitality and “good neighborliness.” This wasn’t an accident. This was diplomatic theater, a warmup act before Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords. Had Hamas not attacked on October 7, 2023, that union would likely have materialized. The message is clear: Germany and France fought from the Franco-Prussian War through WWII before building a prosperous European Union together. Middle Eastern powers understand this precedent. They know regional cooperation beats perpetual conflict.

Before: Berlin, Germany in ruins while Moscow, Soviet Union celebrates in 1945 following WWII

Consider Germany in 1945. Not just defeated—destroyed. Split in two. Industrial capacity plundered. Military obliterated. Four million men dead. Twelve million Germans expelled from Eastern and Central Europe in what historians debate may constitute genocide. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, emerged as WWII’s greatest victor, commanding the world’s most powerful army and inspiring communist movements globally. Fast forward 50 years. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Germany reunited and became the world’s third-largest economy, an industrial juggernaut, the de facto leader of the European Union, and one of the world’s most desirable destinations for immigrants. The Germans went from pariah to prosperity in two generations. Are Palestinians worse off than post-WWII Germans? Does Palestine have more global sympathy? If Germany could rise from total destruction, what’s stopping Palestine?

After: Germany reunites in 1990 while the Soviet Union splits up in 1991

Here’s the uncomfortable truth: corrupt leadership has devastated Palestinian prospects. The PLO, Fatah, and Hamas all started with genuine aspirations for statehood but became seduced by international aid money. These organizations have siphoned billions while ordinary Palestinians remain impoverished. Blaming Israel for Palestine’s misfortunes becomes pointless when internal corruption remains unaddressed. Since the Oslo Accords in 1992, progress has stalled—not primarily because of Israeli obstruction, but because Palestinian leadership has failed its people.

So what should Palestinians do? Accept reality and build from there. With the USA and Arab states as mediators, Palestinian leaders should secure recognition of Palestinian statehood—even if it means accepting painful compromises like not having Jerusalem as the capital and recognizing Israel’s right to exist. Then fix internal governance. Develop a political system that serves the people, not the leaders’ bank accounts. This is prerequisite to everything else. Build a real economy. Stop depending on foreign aid. Create industries, jobs, and infrastructure. Avoid the Islamist routes of Afghanistan and Somalia or the militant route of Sudan—these lead to violence and failed states. Instead, look to Jordan and the UAE as role models. These nations have built stable, prosperous societies that balance tradition with pragmatic governance.

If Palestinians implement this pragmatic vision, they can replicate the UAE’s success within decades and join the ranks of respectable Middle Eastern nations. The alternative—clinging to fantasies of Israel’s erasure—means another 80 years of suffering, corruption, and missed opportunities. Germany rose from the ashes. Japan rebuilt from atomic devastation. South Korea emerged from military dictatorship to become an economic powerhouse. Vietnam unified and is now a manufacturing hub. Even Rwanda has become an African success story after genocide. The question isn’t whether Palestinians can succeed. It’s whether Palestinian leadership will finally choose pragmatism over ideology, prosperity over perpetual grievance, and their children’s future over political theater.

The path exists. It requires swallowing pride, accepting uncomfortable compromises, and focusing relentlessly on building rather than destroying. Eighty years of the current approach have failed. Perhaps it’s time to try something different.

With a Little Help From My ‘Friends’

Throughout history, great powers have mastered the art of controlling nations without conquest. The strategy is elegant in its simplicity: first, secure influence through financial incentives—mining rights in Ghana, oil fields in Syria, coffee plantations in Nicaragua. When cooperation falters, they activate Plan B. This backup plan never requires boots on the ground. Instead, they fund local insurgents with cash and weapons, train fighters in secondary locations far from scrutiny, and control the narrative through media, painting even questionable groups as freedom fighters. The genius lies in plausible deniability. If the operation fails, there’s no accountability. If it succeeds, a puppet government emerges. Either way, the superpower wins. But what about the people caught in the middle?

Senator John McCain with Syrian rebels

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the world watched as poorly armed Mujahideen guerrillas achieved the impossible—defeating one of two global superpowers. Foreign fighters, primarily from Pakistan and Arab states, joined the cause. Desperate against Soviet brutality, Afghans welcomed every able-bodied volunteer. The strategy worked. By 1989, the Soviets withdrew in defeat, and the Muslim world erupted in celebration. Then came the reckoning. Civil war tore apart the coalition that had fought together. The Taliban emerged victorious in 1996, imposing brutal policies including banning women from education—a direct assault on Islamic values in the name of Islam. The foreign fighters who had “saved” Afghanistan left behind a fractured nation unable to govern itself.

The pattern repeated in Chechnya. Following the Soviet collapse, Chechnya fought for independence from 1992 to 1996. Al-Qaeda operatives, including Saudi national Ibn al-Khattab, joined the fight. Against all odds, Chechnya won independence in 1996, and Muslims worldwide celebrated again. Surely these Islamist groups would help build a functioning state? Ibn al-Khattab had other plans. Rather than governance, he established terrorist training centers throughout the Caucasus. Internal fighting consumed the next two years. Enter Vladimir Putin. In 1999, Russia’s new Prime Minister launched a second war. This time, Chechnya was crushed and reintegrated into Russia. The brief taste of freedom—made possible partly by foreign fighters—ultimately cost Chechens their independence entirely.

Gaza presents the most recent example. In 2005, Hamas defeated the internationally-backed Fatah in democratic elections. Despite being militant and isolated, Hamas represented change, and Palestinians voted for hope. Muslims celebrated another Islamist victory. What followed was fratricidal nightmare. Instead of uniting against the threat on their borders, Hamas and Fatah plunged into civil war. Hamas assassinated Fatah members and supporters, imprisoned dissenters, and subjected questioners to torture. Most shocking, Hamas forces shot Palestinian civilians attempting to collect humanitarian aid. The pattern repeated: initial victory, followed by devastating internal conflict that harmed civilians more than the external enemy ever had.

A Familiar Story: Infighting in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Gaza

The uncomfortable truth is this: since the 1990s, when Islamist foreign fighters join liberation movements in Muslim states, they consistently cause more damage to civilians than the non-Muslim oppressors they claimed to fight. Why does this happen? Young men who become foreign fighters are fanatical soldiers but terrible rulers. Their skills lie in combat, their mindset in martyrdom. They actively seek conflict rather than stability, lack administrative capacity to govern, refuse to yield power to civilian leadership, thrive in chaos instead of peace, and transform victories into warlord fiefdoms. Numbers feel reassuring during desperate struggles, but history screams a warning: the cost of foreign fighter assistance far exceeds any temporary military advantage.

Muslim nations will continue facing moments when populations demand change from entrenched rulers. This is natural in the transition toward effective governance, but success requires learning from past mistakes. When removing an overstaying leader, the process must prioritize legal mechanisms whenever possible, ensure leadership succession is planned before transition begins, use military force sparingly and under civilian oversight, accept financial assistance cautiously favoring humanitarian aid over weapons, and establish one firm red line: no foreign fighters under any circumstances. Foreign fighters transform homelands into mercenary playgrounds. What begins as “assistance” evolves into competing warlord factions fighting for territory, extended conflict long after the original grievance, state collapse as seen in Afghanistan and Somalia, international intervention with strings attached, and lost sovereignty as external powers claim stakes. The principle is simple: if change cannot be achieved by the local population using primarily local resources, then the change is not truly yours. Victory obtained through foreign military intervention becomes a hollow achievement—you trade one master for another.

External powers have long manipulated Muslim nations by funding insurgencies and backing armed groups. This strategy works because we allow it to work. By accepting foreign fighters, we invite external interests to dictate our futures. Mastering self-determination means accepting that genuine change takes longer without foreign assistance, understanding that harder-won victories are more sustainable, recognizing that civilian casualties from internal conflict destroy the legitimacy of any cause, building administrative capacity alongside military resistance, and planning for governance before achieving military victory. Every liberation movement faces a critical decision point: accept foreign fighters and boost numbers immediately, or reject them and fight with only local support. History has rendered its verdict. The short-term gain of foreign fighters leads to long-term catastrophe. The initial victory celebrations ring hollow when civil war follows. The young martyrs who helped win freedom become the warlords who destroy it.

If the Ummah embraces this lesson, we achieve two crucial victories: we neutralize the external power strategy of controlling us through funded insurgencies, and we guarantee that our change is authentically ours—built by local people, for local people, with local legitimacy. The path is harder. The timeline is longer. The sacrifice is greater. But the outcome is ours to keep.

Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Gaza teach the same painful lesson: foreign assistance in liberation struggles comes with a price tag that compounds over decades. The Afghans, Chechens, and Palestinians are worse off today than before their “victories.” The question is not whether Muslim nations will face internal struggles for reform and justice—they will. The question is whether we’ll repeat the mistakes of the past, or finally internalize the lesson written in blood across multiple continents. True liberation cannot be outsourced. Freedom fighters who understand governance, who plan for peace as carefully as for war, who prioritize civilian protection over martyrdom—these are the forces that build lasting change. Reject the foreign fighters. Accept the longer road. Own your destiny. Only then will victory mean something more than a temporary celebration before the next tragedy.

Compensation for Competency Using Commitment

When an ideology cannot compete on merit, it demands loyalty instead. When institutions lag rivals, leaders don’t fix the institutions—they intensify commitment to the ideology. This is the pattern of compensating for competency using commitment: doubling down on fervor when facing failure, silencing dissent to mask incompetence, and demanding that believers work harder rather than work smarter. History shows us this strategy always fails. The only question is how much damage it causes before the collapse.

After WWII, the Soviet Union’s economy grew as it industrialized, apartment complexes were built for the growing urban population. Heck, it even made some global accomplishments as it had the first man to go to space in the form of Yuri Gagarin in 1961. Times were good indeed.

But then after the ouster of Nikita Khruschev in 1965, Brezhnev took over the communist superpower for the next two decades and saying he overstayed his welcome is an understatement. By the mid-70s, Western European nations such as West Germany and Italy not only recovered but entered the first world. Ironically, the biggest winner of WWII faced economic stagnation. It was obvious to the Reds that the West had won in terms of quality – economically and militarily. More importantly, the entire world was in love with Western soft power in the forms of Hollywood movies and MTV’s music videos. Seriously, what was your favorite Soviet movie from the 70s?

Soviet Economy: Comparison against Western Europe and the USA from 1945 – 1991 tells the story

The solution they came up with? The Soviet Union had size. It was the largest country in terms of land area and had a population of 290 million, 11 timezones and over 100 languages. Since they couldn’t match Western quality, they would overwhelm with quantity. The Soviets made its people commit to the idea of communism. Imagine, making waves of soldiers run towards the enemy who had superior weapons to the point of eventually overtaking them through sheer numbers and fanaticism. Metaphorically, that is the idea they had. Anyone who questioned whether communism was working was at best ostracized as a traitor or at worst imprisoned for life. Ironically, this killed the any chances of reform that could have saved the biggest political experiment of the 20th century. Instead, you had an entire nation who had to bow down and admit communism was working and only had to work harder and believe in the cause. For a few years it worked. Remember, communism was at its strongest in the mid-80s with the confrontation between the 2 superpowers almost culminating when USA president Ronald Reagan called it an ‘empire of evil’. But when a younger Soviet leader named Mikhail Gorbachev took over and implemented perestroika, communism started fizzling out. In the time of under 5 years, communism collapsed starting with Poland and ended with Kazakhstan. Pro-Kremlin critics now blame Gorbachev for the collapse, but it was inevitable. The Soviet Union attempted to compensate for the competency of the West’s economic success, softpower popularity and military capabilities by implementing rigorous commitment in its people. It failed.

This pattern—demanding commitment to mask incompetence—is not unique to communism. It is the hallmark of totalitarian ideologies that cannot compete with results. And today, we are watching it happen again.

After the end of the 6-day war in 1967, when the Arab militaries lost to tiny Israel in under a week, Arab nationalism died. A new kid on the block entered in the form of political Islam – known today as Islamism. In 1979, 3 events helped Islamism to capitulate to the global market similar to what happened to communism.

Triple threat of 1979: Islamic Revolution in Iran, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Grand Mosque Seizure in Mecca

With Shia Iran and Sunni Saudis having a contest to see who could out-Islam the other, political Islam spread globally. However, after multiple war attempts with Israel, it was obvious to the Arabs, they can’t beat Israel militarily. In terms of science and technology they are behind – there are only two universities from Muslim countries consistently ranked in the top 100. The Islamist world is implementing a similar strategy with measuring up to their adversaries. They know they cannot compete with them as their institutions aren’t as successful. Instead, a culture has been driven where fanaticism and excess commitment is encouraged by saying they will eventually win. Any Muslim who questions the effectiveness of political Islam is branded a traitor and called a ‘Mossad agent’—the exact same tactic the Soviets used when they labeled dissidents as traitors. The playbook is identical: when you can’t win on merit, demand absolute loyalty and silence critics.

Once again, a totalitarian ideology is attempting to compensate for competency using commitment. And similarly, there will be a sharp rise of Islamism before a sudden vertical drop. The problem is the longer it takes, the harder the fall will be. Political Islam has been on the ascent since the 70s and is now entering its fiftieth year, which means it has exceeded communism’s timeline.

When communism fell, the West was there to integrate the Soviet republics within their sphere of influence; but even then, Russia suffered economically and socially throughout the 90s. There will not be a similar buffer when political Islam falls. Muslims should heed this warning: the voices within our communities calling for reform, questioning the effectiveness of political Islam, advocating for institutional development over ideological purity—these are not traitors. They are trying to prevent a catastrophic collapse. Silencing them only hastens the fall. The Soviet Union proved that you cannot compensate for failing institutions with demands for greater commitment. Commitment without competency leads only to ruin. The choice is whether to learn from history or repeat it.